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Information discovery and transmission in the financial market is at the core of finance and 
accounting research. Theories on public news release show that public news events can lead to 
differential interpretations by traders (Kandel and Pearson, 1995; Kim and Verrecchia, 1997; 
Hong and Stein, 1999). Moreover, greater and better public disclosures reduce informational 
asymmetry and cost of capital and enhance firms’ liquidity (Diamond, 1985; Diamond and 
Verrecchia, 1991). Empirical studies also find that disclosure quality primarily affects 
information asymmetry by reducing the likelihood that investors trade on private information, 
and higher quality disclosures could improve aggregate shareholder welfare by reducing search 
costs (e.g., Brown and Hillegeist, 2007). Promoting high quality public information 
environments is always on top of regulators’ agenda (Goldstein and Yang, 2019).  
Short sellers, as a group of sophisticated investors, earn abnormal returns especially from 
heavily shorted stocks (Aitken et al., 1998; Desai et al., 2002; Arnold et al., 2005; Boehme et al., 
2008; Diether et al., 2009; Rapach et al., 2016; Gargano et al., 2018; etc.). Researchers are 
interested in knowing the sources of short sellers’ trading profitability and what kind of 
information motivates short selling activity. Some studies focus on private information while 
others examine public information like firm fundamentals and news announcements. For 
example, Engelberg et al. (2012) and von Beschwitz et al. (2017) show that short sellers are 
skilled processors of public information. Recently, Wang et al. (2019) document that short sellers 
appear to have shifted trading on short-term private information to trading on long-term public 
information that is gradually incorporated into stock prices. However, the process by which short 
sellers interpret public information is understudied in the literature.  
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Most existing studies on the relation between short selling and fundamentals focus on 
financial statement data but not the entire annual reports (Liberti and Petersen, 2019). In this 
study, we fill this gap by adopting the textual analysis approach to examine whether short sellers 
use qualitative information in annual reports. Particularly, we are interested in the type of annual 
reports that attract short sellers’ attention. We adopt textual analysis to quantify the soft 
information as prior studies show that qualitative information in annual reports has predicative 
power for firm fundamentals and stock prices (Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008; Li, 2008; 
Jegadeesh and Wu, 2013; Loughran and MacDonald, 2011, 2014, 2016; Buehlmaier and Whited, 
2018; Huang et al., 2019).  
We focus on the annual reports for two reasons. First, annual reports are publicly available 
to all interested parties, especially in the Internet era (Drake et al., 2017). Drake et al. (2015) 
document that 10-Ks are the most commonly requested filings in SEC’s EDGAR system, and 
count for 21% of all requests. As a result, financial disclosures such as 10-Ks make up a critical 
component of the information set available to investors. Second, annual reports provide an 
excellent setting because it contains the most comprehensive information about the firm over the 
past fiscal year. Psychology studies find that limited attention is a necessary consequence of the 
vast amount of information available in the environment, such that limited memory, attention, 
and processing capacities force investors to focus on a subset of available information 
(Hirshleifer, 2001; Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003). On average the number of words in the annual 
reports is more than 50,000, which is long enough for short sellers to reveal their preferences on 
the type of information in the annual reports.1 Short sellers might directly search for negative 
                                                          
1 For example, apart from the details of financial statements, the section of Management’s Discussion and Analysis 
(MD&A) provides the views of managements about the firm’s future. In addition, Crane et al. (2018) provide 
evidence on hedge funds, one group of short sellers, download annual reports via EDGAR.  
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information which has not been incorporated into the stock price yet, or they may assess whether 
the stock is overvalued relative to fundamentals.2  
Using textual data from annual reports during 2009 to 2015 and daily shorting volume data 
from NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq, we find that textual variables predict the abnormal shorting volume 
in the 4-day event window [0, 3]. Short sellers are more willing to short the stock if the firm’s 
annual report is lengthy and contains more uncertainty and negative words. Using hedge funds’ 
searching for 10-Ks from EDGAR as a proxy for their interest in a firm, we show that there is a 
strongly positive relation between hedge funds’ requests of 10-Ks and abnormal shorting volume 
on the filing dates of 10-Ks, suggesting that information contained in 10-Ks is useful to short 
sellers.  
We next investigate whether abnormal shorting volume and textual information can predict 
future stock returns. The literature documents that short sellers are skilled information 
processors.3 If short sellers are able to extract negative information from ambiguous writings, we 
should observe a strong negative relation between abnormal shorting volume and abnormal stock 
returns. However, short sellers may have behavioral bias just as other investors.4 For example, 
Ditto and Lopez (1992) find that the information consistent with a preferred conclusion will be 
examined less critically than information inconsistent with a preferred conclusion, and 
                                                          
2 Hunton and McEwen (1997) use experiments and find that more accurate analysts employ a directive information 
search strategy, whereas less accurate analysts employ a sequential search strategy. In addition, post-experiment 
survey results show the linkage between specific accounting information used by analysts and the accuracy of their 
forecasts.  
3 See, for example, Desai et al. (2006), Karpoff and Lou, (2010), Drake et al. (2011), Fang et al. (2016), Engelberg 
et al. (2012), and von Beschwitz et al. (2017). 
4 See a survey paper by Hirshleifer (2001). For financial analysts, another group of important market participants, 
the literature also well documents the bias they have made. For example, Easterwood and Nutt (1999) find that 
analysts overreact to good news but underreact to bad news. Experimental studies find that given equivalent 
information disclosure about a firm, different presentation ways affect the valuations and trades of investors even 
experienced financial analysts (see Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003).  
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consequently, less information is required to reach the former case than the latter case.5 Recently, 
Huang et al. (2019) examine institutional trading surrounding corporate news, and find that 
institutions mainly trade on the tone of news directly after the earliest news release. If short 
sellers simply base their trading on the writing style of annual reports (like pessimistic tone with 
more negative words) and without further analyses, abnormal shorting volume may not lead to 
trading profits.  
The empirical results on stock return predictability are summarized as follows. First, 
textual variables predict abnormal returns in the 4-day event window [0, 3]. Secondly, short 
selling is informative about stock returns when short sellers use textual information on modal 
weak words. Third, textual variables also predict 1-week to 12-week ahead abnormal returns. 
Using fitted abnormal shorting volume (i.e., shorting volume driven by textual information), we 
find a significantly negative relation between abnormal shorting volume and abnormal stock 
returns from [0, 3] days to 2-week ahead. The results suggest that short sellers are skilled 
processors of both qualitative and quantitative information, and they are able to discover 
negative information from complex annual reports.  
We further investigate the source of the return predictability of short selling and textual 
information by examining the revisions of analysts’ earnings forecasts, and changes in firm 
fundamentals subsequently. Our results show that the revisions of analysts’ earnings forecasts 
around filing months are related to the ratio of negative and modal weak words, but unrelated to 
abnormal shorting volume. It suggests that analysts and short sellers do not influence each other 
                                                          
5 Using experiments, Hales (2007) also finds that consistent with the theories of motivated reasoning, directional 
preferences affect how information is processed. Hales finds that investors are motivated to agree unthinkingly with 
information that suggests that they might make money on their investments, but disagree with information that 
suggests they might lose money. 
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around 10-Ks filing dates. The ratio of negative words also predicts changes in returns on assets 
and asset turnover in the next fiscal year.  
Finally, motivated by Hutton et al. (2009), Callen and Fang (2015), Kim, Wang, and Zhang 
(2019), and Deng et al. (2020), we investigate whether abnormal shorting volume and textual 
information can predict future crash risk. We find some evidence that the ratio of uncertainty 
words is negatively related to crash risk proxies. However, the interaction of abnormal shorting 
volume with uncertainty words is positively related to crash risk. This suggests that short sellers 
are informative about a firm’s future crash risk, which is consistent with findings of Karpoff and 
Lou (2010).  
Our study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, we contribute to the 
growing literature on how short sellers process information, by focusing on the textual 
information in annual reports. As far as we know, this is the first study to examine the relation 
between annual reports and short selling activities. The way for short sellers to make profit is 
through future stock price depreciation, which could come from current stock prices not 
reflecting the true future prospects of the firms. 6  Studies find that short sellers utilize 
fundamental analysis when targeting overvalued companies7 and they are superior in analyzing 
public information and taking advantage from noise traders.8 Another branch of studies focuses 
on how short sellers use private information to form their trading strategies (Christophe et al., 
2004; Khan and Lu, 2013; Shi et al., 2017; Berkman et al., 2017; Berkman and Eugster, 2017, 
and Purnanandam and Seyhun, 2018). Our study complements Engelberg et al. (2012) and von 
                                                          
6 This overvaluation could also be purely from negative information that has not been incorporated into share prices 
due to short-sale constraints and a large difference in investors’ opinions (Miller, 1977; Chen et al., 2002; Nagel, 
2005; Boehme et al., 2006; Berkman et al., 2009). 
7 For instance, Dechow (2001), Curtis and Fargher (2014), Deshmukh et al. (2015), and Drake et al. (2015). 
8 See, Desai et al. (2006), Karpoff and Lou (2010), Drake et al. (2011), Fang et al. (2016), Engelberg et al. (2012), 
and von Beschwitz et al. (2017). 
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Beschwitz et al. (2017) by further studying short sellers’ use of textual information in annual 
reports.  
Our study also contributes to the emerging literature on investor’s information acquisition, 
especially information acquisition from EDGAR. Drake et al. (2015) analyze the determinants of 
users’ access of SEC filings through EDGAR, and find that EDGAR search activity is positively 
related to firm events and information environments. Crane et al. (2018) examine whether hedge 
funds profit from publicly available SEC filings at EDGAR, and conclude that hedge funds use 
public information to complement their private signals. Li and Sun (2019) find that the abnormal 
number of IPs searching for firms’ financial statements strongly predicts future stock returns and 
firm fundamentals. Our paper complements Drake et al. (2015, 2017), Crane et al. (2018), and Li 
and Sun (2019) and find that there is a strongly positive relation between the number of EDGAR 
requests and abnormal shorting volume, and these activities are informative about future stock 
returns.  
Finally, we contribute to the literature on textual analysis. Existing finance and accounting 
literature on textual analysis mainly focus on annual reports. Those studies either focus on the 
relation between different attributes of annual reports and firm performance (Li, 2008; Dyer et al., 
2017, and Buehlmaier and Whited, 2018) or develop new methods for textual analysis.9 Textual 
analysis also helps to explain the underpricing of IPOs (Hanley and Hoberg, 2010; Jegadeesh 
and Wu, 2013) and are useful for predicting future stock market returns (Jiang et al., 2019). We 
add to the literature by studying how the textual information can be used by short sellers in their 
trading. 
                                                          
9 See, Brown and Tucker (2011), Jegadeesh and Wu (2013), Loughran and MacDonald (2011, 2014, 2016), and Ke 
et al. (2019). 
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The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and variables 
construction. Section 3 provides empirical evidence from daily shorting volume and textual 
information. Section 4 discusses empirical results on abnormal stock returns and textual 
information. Section 5 investigates the relation with fundamentals. Section 6 examines whether 
related to crash risk. Section 7 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Data and variables construction 
2.1  Data 
Our main analysis relies on the daily shorting volume from September 2009 to December 
2015, which is available to download from the FINRA website.10 We compute the daily shorting 
volume from the Regulation SHO monthly short sale transaction file from NYSE and Nasdaq 
which report independently. We then aggregate them at the stock level. We choose the monthly 
transaction file to construct daily shorting volume rather than directly use the daily short sale 
volume data which are also available at the FINRA website. The reason is that “some offsetting 
buying activity related to reported short selling would not be reflected in the Daily File” as 
reported in the FINRA website. In other words, using the daily file will underestimate shorting 
volume. 11  We include only common stocks (share code 10 and 11 in CRSP) listed on 
NYSE/Amex and Nasdaq. 
                                                          
10 See the website: http://www.finra.org/. The sample of our study ends in December 2015, because our EDGAR 
download data end in December 2015.  
11 For a particular day (March 18, 2019) that we check, 83% of the securities have the same shorting volume from 
the monthly short sale transaction file and the daily short sale volume file; while the remaining 17% have higher 
shorting volume from the monthly file than the daily file. Overall, shorting volume from the monthly file is 0.44% 
higher than it from the daily file.  
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We obtained the initial 10-Ks textual data from the website of The Notre Dame Software 
Repository for Accounting and Finance.12 We use the Loughran-McDonald 10X File summaries 
file, a file containing sentiment counts, file size, and other measures for all 10-X filings for all 
years.  
The hedge funds’ downloads of 10Ks from EDGAR are merged and computed from three 
databases. First, we obtain a list of hedge funds that are similar to Jiang (2019).13 We next 
manually search each hedge fund’s IP address from a commercial IP address database 
(https://db-ip.com/) and finally match each hedge fund’s download of 10Ks from the Securities 
and Exchanges Commission’s (SEC) EDGAR log file database at the daily level.14 We further 
merge this data with other databases by the CIK code.  
Monthly stock returns, prices, and the number of shares outstanding are obtained from the 
CRSP. Annual accounting data are obtained from Compustat. Analysts’ earnings forecasts data 
are obtained from the I/B/E/S database. Institutional ownership data are obtained from the 
Thomson Institutional Ownership database (13-F). Daily shorting volume data are merged with 
the CRSP with the stock symbol trading on the exchanges. Textual data and EDGAR download 
data are merged with the CRSP with the CIK code by the filing date. Institutional ownership data, 
analysts’ earnings forecasts data, and accounting data are merged either by PERMNO, Cusip, or 
stock trading symbol. Table 1 provides details of the sample construction.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
2.2  Short sale variables  
                                                          
12 See the website: https://sraf.nd.edu/. Up to our download date, the textual data are from 1986 to 2018, but only 
from 1996 to 2017 have the complete data for common stocks. We acknowledge Bill McDonald for maintaining this 
website and provide the data freely.  
13 We acknowledge Wenxi Jiang for sharing his hedge fund list. For the detail of the hedge fund list construction, 
please refer to Section III.A of Jiang (2019).  
14 For the detailed description of EDGAR log file database, please refer to Section 3.1 of Li and Sun (2019).  
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We use cumulative abnormal shorting volume for the event-day window [0, 3] (𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡) 
as our main measure of shorting volume, where day 0 is the filing day of the 10-K annual report 
available on SEC’s EDGAR. We first normalize shorting volume for firm i on day d (𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑑) 
as the ratio of daily shorting volume (𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑑 ) divided by total share outstanding 
(𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖). We use the average of normalized daily shorting volume (𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑑) in 
the past 100 days skipping the first 20 days (i.e., from day -120 to day -21) to proxy for normal 
daily shorting volume (𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑑). Abnormal shorting volume (𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑑) for firm i on 
day d is therefore defined as follows: 









Finally, the four-day cumulative shorting volume for firm i (𝐶𝑢𝑚𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖) is defined as: 
 𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖 = 𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡[0,3]𝑖 =  ∑ 𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑑
3
𝑑=0 , (2) 
Hedge funds are the major type of short sellers. We use hedge funds’ 10Ks download from 
EDGAR as a proxy for the short sellers’ download of annual reports and define 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 as 
the number of hedge funds’ downloads of 10Ks from EDGAR at the daily level.  
 
2.3 Textual variables  
We use the following six variables from Loughran-McDonald’s 10X File summaries file: (i) 
𝑛_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠, which is the count of all words, where a word is any token appearing in the Master 
Dictionary; (ii) 𝑛_𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦 , which is the number of words related to uncertainty; (iii) 
𝑛_𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘, which is the number of words related to modal weak; (iv) 𝑛_𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔, 
which is the number of words related to modal strong; (v) 𝑛_𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒, which is the number of 
words related to negative; and (vi) 𝑛_𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒, which is the number of words related to positive.  
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We construct three ratios related to information from textual. Specifically, 𝑅_𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦 
is defined as the ratio of 𝑛_𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦 divided by 𝑛_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠; 𝑅_𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘 is defined as the 
ratio of 𝑛_𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘  divided by the sum of 𝑛_𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑒𝑘  and 𝑛_𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔 ; and 
𝑅_𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒  is defined as the ratio of 𝑛_𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒  divided by the sum of 𝑛_𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒  and 
𝑛_𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒. For other variables used in the regression, we take the natural logarithm. Finally, we 
calculate 𝑛_𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 as the number of 10Ks filings per day.  
 
2.4 Abnormal stock returns 
We define the buy-and-hold abnormal return for stock i from day j to day k (𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅[𝑗, 𝑘]𝑖) 
as follows. 




𝑑=𝑗 , (3) 
where 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑑 is the daily stock return for firm i on day d and 𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑑 is the daily value-weighted 
CRSP market index return on day d. We construct 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 during the 4-day event window [0, 3] 
and denote it as 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅4𝑑 .15 For the weekly frequency, similar to Eq. (3), we construct the 
cumulative abnormal weekly returns after the filing date in the 1-week, 2-week, 4-week, 12-
week, 24-week, or 52-week period, which is denoted as 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅1𝑤 , 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅2𝑤 , 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅4𝑤 , 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅12𝑤, 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅24𝑤, or 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅52𝑤.  
 
2.5 Analysts’ earnings forecasts 
                                                          
15 We follow Loughran and McDonald (2011) to use the 4-day cumulative return of [0, 3]. Furthermore, Choi et al. 
(2017) report that hedge funds short sales covering five trading days are highly profitable, but not for more than five 
days.  
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where 𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆1𝑖,𝑡−1 denotes analysts’ earnings forecasts per share for fiscal year 1 at month t-1. 
We similarly calculate the revision of analysts’ earnings forecasts for fiscal year 2 (∆𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆2𝑖,𝑡).  
 
2.6  Fundamental variables 
We adopt the following three accounting-related variables from annual financial statements 
to measure the changes in a firm’s fundamental: (i) the change in return on assets from fiscal 
year y to y+1 ( ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑦 ), (ii) the change in asset turnover from fiscal year y to y+1 
(∆𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑦); and (iii) the change in operating profit margin before depreciation from fiscal 
year y to y+1 (∆𝑂𝑃𝑀𝑖,𝑦).  
 
2.7  Measures of crash risk 
We follow Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) and Bae, Lim, and Wei similarly to construct 
three measures of the crash risk in fiscal year y+1. The first crash risk measure is the negative of 
the third central moment of firm-specific weekly returns scaled by the variance of firm-specific 
weekly returns raised to the power of 3/2 (𝑁𝑆𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑖,𝑡) using data from the past 52 weeks: 
 𝑁𝑆𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑖,𝑦 = −
(𝑛(𝑛 − 1))3/2 ∑ (𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑤,𝑦 − 𝑅𝑒𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑖,𝑦)
3𝑛
𝑤=1





where 𝑤𝑖,𝑤,𝑦 is the firm-specific weekly stock return for week w in year y, and ?̅?𝑖,𝑦  is the mean 
firm-specific weekly stock return for year y and n is the number of weeks in year y. We put a 
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negative sign in front of the skewness so that a higher 𝑁𝑆𝑘𝑒𝑤 value corresponds to a more 
negative-skewed stock return distribution, namely, higher crash risk. 
The second crash risk measure is the “down-to-up” volatility ratio (𝐷𝑈𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑅𝑖,𝑦), which is 
calculated as follows: 
 𝐷𝑈𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑅𝑖,𝑦 = 𝐿𝑛 {
𝑛𝑢𝑝(∑ (𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑤,𝑦 − 𝑅𝑒𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑖,𝑦)
2)𝑤∈𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛




where 𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 (𝑛𝑢𝑝) is the number of up (down) weeks, 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑤,𝑦 the return for firm i in w during 
year y and 𝑅𝑒𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑖,𝑦 is the mean of the weekly returns. A down (up) week is defined as a week 
when the firm-specific weekly return is above (below) the mean weekly return over fiscal year y. 
Since 𝐷𝑈𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑅𝑖,𝑦 does not involve the third moment, it is therefore less likely to be affected by a 
small number of extremely weekly returns. 
The last measure of crash risk is the difference in the frequencies between extreme negative 
returns and extreme positive returns (𝑛_𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑦), which is defined as follows: 
 𝑛_𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑦 = 𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 − 𝑛𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 . (7) 
This measure is based on the number of firm-specific weekly returns exceeding 3.09 standard 
deviations below (𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒) and above (𝑛𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒) the mean firm-specific weekly return over the 
fiscal year. The value 3.09 is chosen to generate the frequency of 0.1% in the normal distribution. 
A higher value of 𝑛_𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ indicates a higher frequency of crashes. 
 
2.8  Control variables 
We include the following common control variables (i) firm size (𝑆𝑍), which is measured 
as market capitalization in million dollars; (ii) book-to-market equity ratio (𝐵/𝑀); (iii) Amihud’s 
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illiquidity measure ( 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞 ); (iv) institutional ownership scaled by the number of shares 
outstanding (𝐼𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟); (v) cumulated past 1-year stock returns (𝑃𝑟1𝑦) to proxy for momentum 
strategy; and (vi) idiosyncratic volatility (𝐼𝑉𝑜𝑙), which is the mean squared error of residuals of 
daily stock returns from the last three months estimated from the Fama-French three-factor 
model augmented by the Carhart momentum factor. The detailed definitions of all these variables 
are described in Appendix A. 
 
2.9  Summary statistics 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics of all variables, which are winsorized at the 1% level. 
Since our main study focuses on the daily shorting volume which is only available from 
September 2009, we also report the summary statistics from September 2009 to December 2015. 
Table 2 shows the mean 𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 is 0.11%, which means that the daily shorting volume during 
the 4-day window [0, 3] is higher than average normal trading days. The mean 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅[0, 3] is -
0.04% during the event window [0, 3], which suggests that the stocks of firms around their 10Ks 
filing dates [0, 3] on average underperform the market.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
For the number of words in the annual reports, the average of total words (𝑛_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠) is 
52,763. The average number of uncertainty words (𝑛_𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦) is 732. The average number 
of negative words is more than positive words in the annual reports, with the averages of 
𝑛_𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 and 𝑛_𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 being 970 and 378, respectively. This is consistent with the number 
of negative and positive words in the Loughran and McDonald Sentiment Word Lists (LM list), 
which are 2,355 and 354. The annual reports also prefer to use modal weak tone, as the number 
of modal weak words is much more than modal strong words (324 vs. 158), compared to the 
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number of modal weak versus modal strong words in the LM list of 27 versus 19. Those textual 
variables are well described in Loughran and McDonald (2011, 2014). For the ratio of textual 
variables, 𝑅_𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 is slightly higher than 𝑅_𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘 (0.711 vs 0.677), while the average 
percentage of uncertainty words in annual reports is 1.43%.  The average number of filing firms 
per day is 89, with variation from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 315. The average 
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 of 10Ks per firm by hedge funds on the filing date is 20.9.  
Other variables describe the characteristics of the sample in the study. For example, the 
average firm size is $4,335 million with the average institutional ownership of 54.9%. The 
average of previous one-year cumulative returns (𝑃𝑟1𝑦) is 25.9%. This is also consistent with 
the fact that overall stock prices in the market increase significantly. For example, the S&P 500 
index increases from 998 in September 1, 2009 to 2,043 on December 31, 2015. This also 
indicates that only very skillful short sellers can make profit in a bull market. 
Table 3 reports the correlation coefficients of main variables. Cumulative abnormal 
shorting volume (𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡) during the event window [0, 3] is positively correlated with the 
length of annul reports (𝐿𝑛(𝑛_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠)) and the number of 10K downloads by hedge funds 
(𝐿𝑛(𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑)). Among textual ratios, 𝑅_𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘  is highly positively correlated with 
𝑅_𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦 (𝜌 = 0.53). Among firm characteristics, 𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝑍) is highly positively correlated 
with Institutional ownership (𝐼𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟) but negatively with illiquidity (𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞) and idiosyncratic 
volatility (𝐼𝑉𝑜𝑙).  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
3. Daily shorting and textual information 
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To investigate short sellers’ reaction to the filing of 10-K reports, we run the following 
pooled OLS regression on cumulative abnormal shorting volume in during the event window [0, 
3] (𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡):  
 
𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
3
𝑗=1 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛾1𝐿𝑛(𝑛_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠)𝑖,𝑡  
+𝛾2𝐿𝑛(𝑛_𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔)𝑡 + ∑ 𝜃𝑗𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 × 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡
3
𝑗=1   
+𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑑𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
(8) 
where 𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙  includes 𝑅_𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦 , 𝑅_𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘 , 𝑅_𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 . To absorb the time-
invariant stock-specific effects and aggregate time trends, we include stock fixed-effects (𝑓𝑖) and 
year-month dummy variables (𝑑𝑚,𝑡) in the regression model. We consider six different model 
specifications and their results are reported in Table 4. Standard errors are double clustered at the 
firm and year-month levels (Petersen, 2009; Prado, Saffi, and Sturgess, 2016). We apply the 
same methods in the regression models throughout the paper.  
Table 4 reports the results. Models 1-4 reports the results without 𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 interacted with 
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑, and Models 5-6 with. Among all the textual ratios analyzed, the coefficients on 
𝑅_𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦 are all significantly positive, ranging from 0.040 to 0.047 and with t-statistics 
ranging from 1.77 to 2.22. The coefficient estimate is also economically significant. Take the 
example of Model 1, a one-standard-deviation increase leads to a 20.5% (= 0.047×0.0048/0.0011) 
increase in 𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡. The results suggest that sellers are more willing to take a short position if 
they discover the hidden negative information from uncertainty words in the annual reports. The 
coefficients on 𝑅_𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 are all negative, ranging from -0.023 (t-stat = -1.41) in Model 1 to -
0.042 (t-stat = 2.41) in Model 3. When firm size is not controlled for, half of them (Models 3, 4, 
and 6) are significant at the 5% level with the coefficient ranging from -0.040 to -0.042. Take the 
example of Model 3, a one-standard-deviation increase in 𝑅_𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒  leads an 18.3% (= 
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0.042×0.0048/0.0011) decrease in 𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡. It suggests that short sellers view more negative 
words in the annual reports as containing positive information and are less willing to take short 
positions. However, this significantly negative relation between negative words and shorting 
volume becomes insignificant in Models 1, 2, and 5, firm size is controlled for. Interestingly, the 
coefficients of the interaction terms are all insignificant. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
For the two variables used to measure the length of annual reports, 𝐿𝑛(𝑛_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠)  is 
positively related to shorting volume in most model specifications. For example, the coefficient 
on 𝐿𝑛(𝑛_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠) is 0.069 with a t-statistic of 3.18 in Model 1, suggesting that short sellers short 
aggressively on firms with lengthy annual reports. A one-standard-deviation increase in 
𝐿𝑛(𝑛_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠) causes a 30.1% (= 0.069×0.0048/0.0011) increase in abnormal shorting volume. 
The result suggests that short sellers may have better skill to analyze a large amount of 
information in the annual reports as the average number of words in annual reports is 52,763.16 
The results are consistent with von Beschwitz et al. (2017) who find that short sellers trade more 
on the days with qualitative news. 
Model 1 also shows that short sellers short less on a particular firm if there are more firms 
filing 10-K reports on the filing date. The coefficient on 𝐿𝑛(𝑛_𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔) is -0.063 (t-stat = 2.50). 
However, this effect is absorbed by the number of 10-K requests by hedge funds on the filing 
date as shown in Models 2-6. Once we include 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑, the coefficients on 𝐿𝑛(𝑛_𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔) is 
no longer significant. Models 2-6 further show that 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑  has the strongest effect on 
shorting volume. For example, the coefficient on 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 in Model 2 is 0.115 (t-stat = 5.06), 
indicating that a one-standard-deviation increase in 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑  causes a 50.1% (= 
                                                          
16 Although not reported, we also find that the number of unique words in annual reports and the gross and net file 
size of annual reports are also positively related to shorting volume.  
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0.115×0.0048/0.0011) increase in abnormal shorting volume. The result provides direct evidence 
on the positive relation between short sellers’ use of annual reports and their abnormal shorting 
activity. Specifically, short sellers take more short positions because more short sellers download 
and read annual reports and find useful information. 
In Model 5-6 of Table 4, textual variables are interacted with 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 to investigate 
which type of textual information interacted with 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑  is favored by short sellers. 
However, the results show that the coefficients on interaction terms are insignificant.  
Finally, we find that several firm-level control variables are related to abnormal shorting 
volume around the filing days. For example, 𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 is positively related to past one-year stock 
returns (𝑃𝑟1𝑦) and idiosyncratic volatility (𝐼𝑉𝑜𝑙), but negatively related to stock illiquidity 
(𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞). These suggest that short sellers prefer to short firms with better liquidity (less transaction 
costs), good past one-year stock performance (contrarian strategies), and a higher difference of 
investors’ opinion. In general, those findings are consistent with the studies related to short 
selling activity (e.g., Negal, 2005; Arnold et al., 2005; Kot, 2007; Chen et al., 2013; Beneish et 
al., 2015, Cheung et al., 2019, etc.). 
 
4. Abnormal stock returns and textual information  
4.1  Abnormal stock returns during the event window [0, 3] 
In this sub-section, we investigate whether textual variables are able to predict abnormal 
stock returns and the role of short sellers play If abnormal shorting volume contains negative 
information conditional on textual variables, we expect the coefficient on the interaction terms 
between them to be significant. We use the following pooled OLS regression to test our 
hypothesis:  




𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅4𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽0𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
3
𝑗=1 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡   
+𝛽5𝐿𝑛(𝑛_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑛(𝑛_𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔)𝑡 + ∑ 𝜃𝑗𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 × 𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡
3
𝑗=1   
+𝜃4𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑑𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
(9) 
where all variables are defined previously. Table 5 reports the results. We find that all three 
textual variables are significantly associated with future abnormal returns. First, a higher 
𝑅_𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦 implies a lower abnormal return, as indicated by the negative coefficients on 
𝑅_𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦 in all models. For example, the coefficient on 𝑅_𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦 is -0.046 (t-stat = 
2.14) in Model 1, suggesting that investors view the uncertainty words in 10-Ks as negative 
information, consistent with short sellers taking more short positions as shown in Table 4.  
Second, a higher 𝑅_𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒  implies a higher abnormal return. For example, the 
coefficient on 𝑅_𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒  is 0.037 (t-stat = 2.01) in Model 2. This result is a bit counter-
intuitive as negative words should represent negative information. We further explore the 
relation of 𝑅_𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 with firm characteristics and find that it highly correlated with book-to-
market (𝐵/𝑀 ) (ρ = 0.22), but not with the previous 1-year return (𝑃𝑟1𝑦 ) and changes in  
𝑅_𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 from the previous year. When we sort 𝑅_𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 into quintiles in each year, the 
average value of 𝐵/𝑀  increases monotonically. Combining the negative relation between 
𝑅_𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 and 𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 from Table 4, it suggests that short sellers are less likely to target 
value stocks with more negative words, probably because the price of value stocks already 
overreact to the negative prospects.  
Third, for the two variables used to measure the length of the annual reports, we find that 
𝐿𝑛(𝑛_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠) is significantly and negatively related to 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅4𝑑 in all models except Model 1. 
For example, the coefficient on 𝐿𝑛(𝑛_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠) in Model 2 is –0.078 (t-stat = -2.71), indicating 
that investors view longer annual reports more negatively, potentially because for such firms 
managers provide a lot of useless information to investors.  
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Fourth, the number of filings per day is also negatively related to abnormal stock returns. 
The coefficients on 𝐿𝑛(𝑛_𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔) is significantly negative in all six models in Table 5, even after 
controlling for 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑  in Models 5-6. For example, the coefficient on 𝐿𝑛(𝑛_𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔) is -
0.067 (t-stat = -2.82) in Model 1, which is consistent with the finding by Hirshleifer, Lim, and 
Teoh (2009) that investors are distracted if there are many 10-K filings in a day. It is also 
consistent with the proposition that managers of firms with bad news tend to time the filing day 
with many 10-K filings to divert investors’ attention. Finally, 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 has a negative relation 
with 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅4𝑑 , which is consistent with the result in Table 4 that 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑  is positively 
associated with abnormal shorting volume.  
[Table 5 here] 
Next, the results from the interactions of 𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 with textual variables indicate that short 
selling is more informative when the annual report contains more modal weak words. For 
example, the coefficients on 𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 × 𝑅_𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘  are both significantly negative (for 
example, coeff = -0.035 with t-stat = -2.21 in Model 4) mean that short sellers taking more 
aggressive short positions when the annual reports contain more modal weak words lead to more 
negative abnormal returns. The informativeness of short selling is further confirmed by the 
highly significant coefficients on 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 and  𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 × 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑. In contrast, the effect 
of abnormal shorting volume on abnormal stock returns is not related to more negative or 
uncertainty words in the 10-K reports.  
Finally, the coefficient on 𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 is significantly positive in all models, suggesting that 
short selling activity itself is unable to predict negative future abnormal returns on average. This 
finding is consistent with prior studies including Choi et al. (2017), Crane et al. (2018), and 
Gargano et al. (2018). For example, Gargano et al. (2018) find that short sellers experience 
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losses on average, consistent with the positive equity risk premium in their sample. Choi et al. 
(2017) find that hedge funds are not profitable if they hold positions more than five trading days, 
and institutional investors’ short sales are not profitable.  
 
4.2  Abnormal stock returns from 1-week to 52-week ahead 
Table 5 shows a significant contemporaneous relation between abnormal shorting volume, 
textual variables, and abnormal stock returns around 10-K filing dates. A natural question is 
whether abnormal shorting volume can predict stock returns in the long-run. We replace 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅4𝑑 with 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅1𝑤 to 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅52𝑤 and re-run Eq. (9). Table 6 reports the result. We find 
that the relation between future stock returns and abnormal shorting volume remains highly 
significant positive in all models with abnormal returns from 1-week to 24-week ahead, but not 
for 52-week ahead. For example, the coefficient on 𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 is 0.126 (t-stat = 5.81) in Model 1 
with 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅1𝑤 and is 0.039 (t-stat = 2.79) in Model 9 with 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅24𝑤. The evidence further 
supports the view that there is a strongly positive relation between abnormal shorting volume 
around 10-K filings and future stock returns up to 24 weeks. However, short sellers 
underperform if they take short positions.  
In contrast, we find that the coefficient on 𝑅_𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦 is significantly negative for 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅1𝑤, 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅12𝑤, and 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅24𝑤, 𝑅_𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘 has a significantly positive coefficient 
for 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅1𝑤 , 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅2𝑤 , and 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅52𝑤 , and 𝑅_𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒  has a significantly negative 
coefficient for all holding horizons except for 12 and 24 weeks. However, the coefficients on all 
interaction terms are insignificant except for 𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 × 𝑅_𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦 (coeff = -0.028; t-stat = 
2.05), suggesting that short sellers are quite efficient in incorporating textual information into 
stock prices during the event window [0, 3], and therefore there is no further return drift after the 
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textual information becomes publicly available.17 Meanwhile, the relation between 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 
and future stock returns is negatively significant for 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅2𝑤, 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅24𝑤, and 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅52𝑤, with 
the coefficients ranging from -0.021 (t-stat = -1.73) in Model 3 to -0.058 (t-stat = -3.80) in Model 
12. Moreover, we find that the negative effect of 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 on future stock returns is amplified 
by abnormal shorting volume for the returns measured by 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅1𝑤, 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅4𝑤, and 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅24𝑤, 
with the coefficients on the interaction term ranging from -0.021 (t-stat = -1.78) in Model 9 to -
0.029 (t-stat = -2.30) in Model 2. These results suggest that hedge funds’ downloads in general 
can negatively predict future returns up to 52 weeks and there is some evidence that abnormal 
shorting volume can amplify this negative download effect.  
[Table 6 here] 
4.3  Robustness checks with fitted shorting volume 
In this section, we decompose shorting volume into two parts: the fitted component and the 
residual component. The fitted shorting volume is driven or motivated by textual information 
contained in annual reports. As a result, if our story is true, it should have a stronger 
predictability for future returns than the residual shorting volume, which is not motivated by 
textual information in annual reports. We first run the following regression to obtain the fitted 
𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 (𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡̂ 𝑖,𝑡): 
 𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
3
𝑗=1 . (10) 
We then run the following regression, 
 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡̂ 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 Ln(𝑛_𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔)𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 
+𝛽4𝐿𝑛(𝑛_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠)𝑖,𝑡+𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑑𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
(11) 
                                                          
17  In unreported regression analyses, when replace 𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡[0, 3]  by 𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡[−3, −1] , we find no relation 
between 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅4𝑑 and 𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡[−3, −1].  
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If 𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡̂  contains useful textual information related to future stock returns, we would expect 
that the coefficient on 𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡̂  to be significantly negative. 
Table 7 reports the results. The coefficients on 𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡̂  are indeed significantly negative 
when the dependent variable is 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅4𝑑 , 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅1𝑤 , and 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅2𝑤 . The corresponding 
coefficients are -0.042 (t-stat = 2.92), -0.035 (t-stat = 2.84), and -0.028 (t-stat = 2.13), 
respectively. More interestingly, the coefficient of 𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡̂   is also significant when the 
dependent variable is 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅52𝑤. These results show that short sellers are indeed informative in 
predicting future poor stock performance, when their aggressive short selling volume is driven 
by textual information. 
[Table 7 here] 
5. Textual information and firm fundamentals 
In Sections 3 and 4, we find significant relationship between abnormal shorting, textual 
variables, and abnormal stock returns. However, the type of information contained in the textual 
variables is still not clear. It is important to know whether textual variables capture information 
from financial statements, as prior studies show that such financial information are used by short 
sellers in identifying overvaluation (Dechow, 2001; Curtis and Fargher, 2014; Deshmukh et al., 
2015; and Drake et al., 2015). In this section, we conduct tests relating abnormal shorting with 
revisions of analysts’ earnings forecasts and change in firm fundamentals.  
 
5.1  Analysts’ earnings forecast revision 
To investigate whether textual information and short selling predicts analyst forecast 
revision, we perform the following regression.  




∆𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆1𝑖,𝑡(∆𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆2𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽0𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
3
𝑗=1 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡   
+𝛽5𝐿𝑛(𝑛_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑛(𝑛_𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔)𝑡 + ∑ 𝜃𝑗𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 × 𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡
3
𝑗=1   
+𝜃4𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑑𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
(12) 
We focus on forecast revisions from month t-1 to month t+1 because the filing dates are 
randomly distributed within a month, and most analysts revisions are issued over the 10 days 
following the filing date (Celment et al., 2011).  
Table 8 reports the results. Among all the textual variables, 𝑅_𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 is positively and 
𝑅_𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘 is negatively related to analysts’ earnings forecast revisions from month t-1 to 
month t+1. The corresponding coefficients are 0.061 (t-stat = 2.82) and -0.026 (t-stat = 1.88) in 
Model 2 for ∆𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆1s and 0.044 (t-stat = 2.31) and -0.034 (t-stat = 2.31) in Model 4 for ∆𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆2. 
The results suggest that more negative (modal weak) words in annual reports are associated with 
upward (downward) revisions of analysts’ forecasts for both fiscal year 1 and year 2 earnings. 
The results are consistent with Drake et al. (2015), who find that short selling strengthens the 
relation between current returns and future earnings, especially in the setting where short sellers 
are likely to possess an information advantage.  
The significant coefficient on 𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 × 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑  shows that analysts’ forecast 
revisions are related to short selling activity, i.e., higher shorting volume with higher 10-Ks 
download by short sellers is negatively related to downward revisions of analysts’ forecasts. The 
coefficients on 𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 × 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 are statistically significant in all models. For example, in 
model 4 the coefficient is -0.036 (t-stat = 2.99).  
Moreover, the predictability of analysts’ revision is stronger for fiscal year 2. The 
coefficients on 𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 and 𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 × 𝑅_𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 are significantly negative in models 3 and 
4. The corresponding coefficients are -0.026 (t-stat = 2.03) and -0.037 (t-stat = 2.12), 
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respectively. The results suggest that the revisions of analysts’ forecasts for fiscal year 2 is 
directly captured by the short selling activity with negative words in the annual reports. 
[Table 8 here] 
5.2  Fundamental ratios 
Prior studies have found that short sellers base on their shorting decisions on fundamental 
analysis (Dechow, 2001; Curtis and Fargher, 2014; Deshmukh et al., 2015). As a result, we 
investigate whether textual information used by short sellers is related to changes in firm 
fundamentals (∆𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑦 ) from the current fiscal year y to year y+1 by replacing 
∆𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆1𝑖,𝑡  with ∆𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑦  in Eq. (12). Our ∆𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙  measures include ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴, 
∆𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛, and ∆𝑂𝑃𝑀. 
Table 9 reports the results. Among all the textual variables, only 𝑅_𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 is positively 
related to changes in return-on-assets ( ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴 ) and in asset turnover ( ∆𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛 ). The 
coefficients on ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴 and ∆𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛 are 0.047 (t-stat = 2.65) and 0.097 (t-stat = 4.34) in 
Models 1 and 3, respectively. The results are consistent with those in Sections 3 and 4. It 
suggests that more negative words in annual reports actually indicate that the firm’s 
fundamentals will improve over the next fiscal year. The coefficients on 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 are negative 
for all measures of ∆𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙, suggesting that the firm’s fundamentals are less likely to 
improve over the next fiscal year if there are more requests of 10-Ks by hedge funds. This 
suggests that short sellers are able to identify firms with deteriorating fundamentals when they 
engage more in information acquisition activities on such firms. 
[Table 9 here] 
6. Crash risk 
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Callen and Fang (2015) find that short interest is positively related to one-year ahead stock 
price crash risk, and this relation is due to bad news hoarding by firm managers. Using 
Regulation SHO as a natural experiment, Deng et al. (2020) find that the lifting of short-sale 
constraints leads to a significant decrease in stock price crash. In addition, using earnings 
management as a proxy for opacity, Hutton et al. (2009) find that opaque firms are more prone to 
stock price crashes. Kim, Wang, and Zhang (2019) find that less readable 10-K reports are 
related to higher stock price crash risk. They argue that managers can successfully hide adverse 
information by writing complex financial reports, which leads to stock price crashes when the 
hidden bad news accumulates and reaches a tipping point. Motivated by these studies, we 
conjecture that short sellers may extract textual information from annual reports that can help 
them predict a firm’s future crash risk (𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑦 ). To test this hypothesis, we replace 
∆𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆1𝑖,𝑡 with 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑦 in Eq. (12). Our 𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 measures include 𝑁𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊, 𝐷𝑈𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑅, 
and 𝑛_𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ. 
Table 10 presents the evidence of the predictability of crash risk using abnormal shorting 
volume and textual information. Model 1 ( 𝐷𝑈𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑅 ) shows that the coefficient on 
𝑅_𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦 is -0.048 (t-stat = 1.92) and 𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 × 𝑅_𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦 is 0.021 (t-stat = 2.00), 
whereas Model 3 (𝑁𝑆𝑘𝑒𝑤) reveals that the corresponding coefficients are -0.046 (t-stat = 1.78) 
and is 0.018 (t-stat = 1.73), respectively. Interestingly, 𝑅_𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦 is marginally negatively 
related to crash risk, which means that fewer uncertainty words in annual reports are associated 
with higher crash risk in the coming year. This finding is consistent with the literature that crash 
risk is caused by bad news hoarding (Callen and Fang, 2015; Kim et al., 2019). The positive 
coefficients on 𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 × 𝑅_𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦  suggest that short sellers can potentially identify 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3683086
 
26 
firms with increasing crash risk through focusing on the frequency of uncertainty words in the 
annual reports.  
[Table 10 here] 
7. Conclusion 
Using textual data from annual reports and daily shorting volume data from 
NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq over 2009-2015, we find that more uncertainty and negative words in 
annual reports are associated with greater abnormal shorting volume. Short selling motivated by 
textual information negatively predicts stock price reaction around the filing date of 10-Ks. 
Further analysis shows that textual information used by short sellers are related to the revisions 
of analysts’ earnings forecasts, changes in firm fundamentals, as well as increasing crash risk 
subsequently. Our results suggest that textual information in annual reports forms an important 
part of short sellers’ information advantage. 
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Appendix: Variable definition 
 






Cumulative abnormal daily shorting volume ratio during the 4-day event 
window [0, 3]. 
Daily shorting volume ratio = daily shorting volume/shares outstanding. 
Abnormal daily shorting volume ratio = Daily shorting volume ratio in day t 
minus the average of the ratio during the event window [-120, -21]. 
Download Number of 10K downloads in EDGAR by hedge funds on the filing date. 
  
Textual variables 
 n_words  
 
The count of all words, where a word is any token appearing in the Master 
Dictionary. 
n_uncertainty  The number of words related to uncertainty. 
n_modalweak The number of words related to modal weak. 
n_modal_strong The number of words related to modal strong. 
n_negative  The number of words related to negative. 
n_positive   The number of words related to positive. 
n_filing The number of 10Ks filings per day. 
R_uncertainty n_uncertainty/n_words. 
R_modalweak n_modalweak/(n_modalweak + n_modal_strong). 
R_negative n_negative/(n_negative + n_positive). 
  





Buy and hold abnormal return: which is the cumulative buy and hold stock 
returns minus the corresponding value-weighted CRSP returns in various event 
windows. For daily returns BHAR4d, the event window is [0, 3]. For weekly 
returns from 1 week to 52 weeks after the filing date, it is denoted as BHAR1w 
to BHAR52w. 
  
Analysts’ earnings forecasts 
∆𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆1 
 
Change in analysts’ earnings forecasts per share for fiscal year y+1 from month 






Change in analysts’ earnings forecasts per share for fiscal year y+2 from month 




  Fundamental variables 
∆𝑅𝑂𝐴 Change in return of assets (ROA) from fiscal year t to fiscal year t+1. 
∆𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛 
 
Change in asset turnover from fiscal year t to fiscal year t+1, where asset 
turnover is sales divided by assets. 
∆𝑂𝑃𝑀 
 
Change in operating profit margin before depreciation measured from fiscal 
year t to fiscal year t+1. 
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The negative of the third central moment of firm-specific weekly return divided 
by the variance of firm-specific weekly returns raised to the power of 3/2. A 
higher NSkew corresponds to a more negative-skewed stock return distribution 








Down-to-up return volatility ratio and is measured as  
𝐷𝑈𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑅𝑖,𝑦 = 𝐿𝑛 {
𝑛𝑢𝑝(∑ (𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑤,𝑦 − 𝑅𝑒𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑖,𝑦)
2)𝑤∈𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛
𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛(∑ (𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑤,𝑦 − 𝑅𝑒𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑖,𝑦𝑤∈𝑈𝑝 )
2)
}. 
An up (down) week is defined as a week when the firm-specific weekly return 
is above (below) the annual mean. A higher value of DUVolR indicates a 






The difference in the frequencies between extreme negative returns and 
extreme positive returns based on the number of firm-specific weekly returns 
exceeding 3.09 standard deviations above and below the mean firm-specific 
weekly return over the fiscal year. A higher value of n_Crash corresponds to a 
higher frequency of crashes. 
  
Control variables 
 B/M Book-to-market equity ratio. 
SZ Market capitalization in million dollars. 
IOwner Institutional ownership scaled by the number of outstanding shares. 
Illiq Ahumid’s illiquidity measure. 




Idiosyncratic volatility, which is the mean squared error of residuals of daily 
stock returns from the Fama-French three-factor model augmented by the 
Carhart momentum based on return data from the past three months.  
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Table 1: Sample construction 
 
This table reports the details of the sample construction from the initial 10-Ks sample. CIK is the Central Index Key 
assigned by the SEC. PERMNO is the permanent issue identification number assigned by the CRSP. We obtain the 
initial 10-Ks textual data from the website of The Notre Dame Software Repository for Accounting and Finance, 
daily shorting volume data from the FINRA website, and stock price, returns, shares outstanding, trading volume, 
and accounting data from the CRSP/Compustat.  
 
Source/Filter Sample size Observations 
removed 
Original textual data downloaded from Loughran-McDonald 10X 
File summaries file. Fiscal year ended is from 1988.12.31 – 





Keep form types for 10-K, 10-K405, 10KSB, and 10KSB40 only 242,180 786,494 
Number of words in 10-Ks >= 2,000 235,531 6,649 
Exclude if fiscal year end is missed 234,349 1,182 
Drop the duplicated firms’ fiscal year end or filing date 234,266 83 
Drop if the current filing date and previous filing date is < 180 231,565 2,701 
Drop if filing date is same as fiscal year end 230,325 1.240 
   
Merge with monthly stock returns and control variables by 





   
Daily shorting volume from 2009.8 – 2018.12 8,928,481  
Merge with monthly file by PERMNO and filing date, merged 
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
 
This table reports the summary statistics of variables used in the study. The sample period is from September 2009 
to December 2015. All variables are defined in the Appendix. We obtain the initial 10-Ks textual data from the 
website of The Notre Dame Software Repository for Accounting and Finance, daily shorting volume data from the 
FINRA website, the number of 10-Ks requests by hedge funds from the EDGAR system, and stock price, returns, 
shares outstanding, trading volume, and accounting data from the CRSP/Compustat.  
 
 
N Mean Std Dev Min p5 p50 p95 Max 
CAShort 19,081 0.0011 0.0048 -0.0384 -0.0033 0 0.0096 0.0593 
BHAR4d 19,544 -0.0004 0.0562 -0.2605 -0.0972 -0.0014 0.094 0.2891 
n_words 19,645 53,246 32,979 3,033 23,019 45,833 108,301 1,034,542 
n_uncertainty 19,645 732 359 9 306 672 1,322 5,407 
n_modalweak 19,645 324 186 1 104 287 670 3,286 
n_modalstrong 19,645 158 132 7 49 127 354 5,354 
n_negative 19,645 970 658 27 320 823 2,086 15,892 
n_positive 19,645 378 230 9 140 328 780 3,665 
n_filing 19,645 89 80 1 3 64 232 315 
R_uncertainty 19,645 0.0143 0.0028 0.0027 0.0096 0.0143 0.0187 0.0256 
R_modalweak 19,645 0.6774 0.0769 0.0556 0.5406 0.6862 0.7879 0.8878 
R_negtative 19,645 0.7106 0.0614 0.3995 0.6025 0.7169 0.7994 0.9607 
Download 18,183 20.9 17.6 0 2 16 57 100 
Firm size (SZ) 19,630 4,335 17,628 2 21 518 17,242 666,252 
B/M 17,909 0.8638 1.1992 0.001 0.1186 0.6407 2.31 75.9019 
IOwner 18,618 0.5227 0.3270 0 0.0021 0.5880 0.9495 0.9993 
Illiq 19,643 0.9593 3.5421 0 0.0001 0.0053 5.6806 19.7147 
Pr1y 18,864 0.2594 0.7124 -0.9649 -0.4862 0.1434 1.3183 8.125 
IVol 19,611 0.0239 0.0171 0.0019 0.0078 0.0192 0.0556 0.5437 
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Table 3: Correlation matrix 
 
This table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients of variables used in the study. The sample period is from September 2009 to December 2015. All variables 
are defined in the Appendix. We obtain the initial 10-Ks textual data from the website of The Notre Dame Software Repository for Accounting and Finance, 
daily shorting volume data from the FINRA website, the number of 10-Ks requests by hedge funds from the EDGAR system, and stock price, returns, shares 





























(2) BHAR4d 0.12* 
            
(3) R_uncertainty 0.00 0.01 
           
(4) R_modalweak 0.01 0.02* 0.53* 
          
(5) R_negative 0.01 0.01 0.06* 0.11* 
         
(6) Ln(n_words) 0.04* 0.00 -0.25* -0.11* 0.21* 
        
(7) Ln(n_filing) -0.01 -0.02* 0.03* -0.02* 0.09* 0.21* 
       
(8) Ln(Download) 0.06* 0.02* -0.03* 0.01 0.02* 0.13* -0.32* 
      
(9) Ln(SZ) -0.01 0.06* 0 0.12* -0.09* 0.41* 0.12* 0.27* 
     
(10) Ln(B/M) -0.03* 0.01 -0.07* -0.09* 0.22* -0.01 0.02* -0.02* -0.32* 
    
(11) IOwner 0.03* 0.07* 0.07* 0.19* -0.07* 0.21* 0.05* 0.12* 0.61* -0.21* 
   
(12) Illiq -0.05* -0.02* -0.06* -0.12* 0.06* -0.20* -0.10* -0.07* -0.41* 0.22* -0.34* 
  
(13) Pr1y 0.05* 0.05* -0.02* -0.01 -0.02* 0.00 0.05* 0.06* 0.05* 0.14* 0.04* -0.07* 
 
(14) IVol 0.22* -0.02* 0.01 -0.08* 0.02 -0.11* -0.06* -0.07* -0.48* 0.08* -0.37* 0.27* 0.05* 
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Table 4: Determinants of abnormal shorting volume 
 
This table reports the results of the following abnormal shorting volume regression: 
 𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
3
𝑗=1 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝜃𝑗𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
3
𝑗=1   
             +𝛾1𝐿𝑛(𝑛_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐿𝑛(𝑛_𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔)𝑡 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑑𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 
 
where 𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡  is the 4-day cumulative abnormal shorting volume during the event window [0, 3]. Textual 
includes R_uncertainty, R_modalweak, and R_negative. All variables are defined in the Appendix and are 
standardized to have the mean of 0 and the standard deviation of 1. We obtain the initial 10-Ks textual data from the 
website of The Notre Dame Software Repository for Accounting and Finance, daily shorting volume data from the 
FINRA website, the number of 10-Ks requests by hedge funds from the EDGAR system, and stock price, returns, 
shares outstanding, trading volume, and accounting data from the CRSP/Compustat. All models include stock fixed-
effects and year-month dummy variables. Standard errors are double clustered at the firm and year-month levels. *, **, 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The sample period is from September 2009 to 
December 2015. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CAShort CAShort CAShort CAShort CAShort CAShort 
R_uncertainty 0.047** 0.046* 0.040*  0.046*  
 (2.22) (1.92) (1.77)  (1.90)  
R_negative -0.023 -0.026 -0.042** -0.040** -0.026 -0.040** 
 (-1.41) (-1.50) (-2.41) (-2.39) (-1.49) (-2.40) 
R_modalweak    0.003  0.003 
    (0.19)  (0.19) 
Download  0.115*** 0.098*** 0.098*** 0.114*** 0.098*** 
  (5.06) (4.64) (4.65) (5.13) (4.76) 
Download×R_uncertainty     -0.004  
     (-0.34)  
Download×R_negative     0.002 0.002 
     (0.15) (0.13) 
Download×R_modalweak      -0.000 
      (-0.01) 
Ln(n_words) 0.069*** 0.062** 0.048** 0.015 0.062** 0.015 
 (3.18) (2.63) (2.29) (1.20) (2.59) (1.21) 
Ln(n_filing) -0.063** -0.008 -0.005 -0.005 -0.008 -0.005 
 (-2.50) (-0.28) (-0.18) (-0.17) (-0.28) (-0.18) 
Ln(SZ) 0.026 -0.017   -0.017  
 (0.33) (-0.21)   (-0.20)  
Ln(B/M) -0.013 -0.007 -0.031 -0.030 -0.007 -0.030 
 (-0.50) (-0.28) (-1.50) (-1.46) (-0.28) (-1.45) 
Pr1y 0.046*** 0.049*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.049*** 0.038*** 
 (3.05) (3.07) (2.75) (2.74) (3.07) (2.75) 
IOwner   0.042 0.043  0.043 
   (1.61) (1.66)  (1.66) 
Illiq   -0.041*** -0.041***  -0.041*** 
   (-4.07) (-4.06)  (-4.05) 
IVol   0.333*** 0.333***  0.333*** 
   (6.43) (6.44)  (6.44) 
Intercept -0.011*** -0.014** 0.013*** 0.011*** -0.015** 0.011*** 
 (-3.53) (-2.22) (3.23) (2.82) (-2.21) (2.81) 
Observations 17,290 16,006 15,995 15,995 16,006 15,995 
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.18 0.22 0.22 0.18 0.22 
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Table 5: Return predictability of abnormal shorting volume and textual information around filing dates 
 
This table reports the results of the following cumulative abnormal return regression: 
 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅4𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽0𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
3
𝑗=1 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑛(𝑛_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠)𝑡  
+𝛽6𝐿𝑛(𝑛_𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔)𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝜃𝑗𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 × 𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
3
𝑗=1   
+𝜃4𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 × 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑑𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 
 
where 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅4𝑑𝑖,𝑡 (𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡) is the 4-day cumulative abnormal return (shorting volume) during the event window 
[0, 3]. Textual includes R_uncertainty, R_modalweak, and R_negative. All variables are defined in the Appendix and 
are standardized to have the mean of 0 and the standard deviation of 1. We obtain the initial 10-Ks textual data from 
the website of The Notre Dame Software Repository for Accounting and Finance, daily shorting volume data from 
the FINRA website, the number of 10-Ks requests by hedge funds from the EDGAR system, and stock price, returns, 
shares outstanding, trading volume, and accounting data from the CRSP/Compustat. All models include stock fixed-
effects and year-month dummy variables. Standard errors are double clustered at the firm and year-month levels. *, **, 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The sample period is from September 2009 to 
December 2015. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 BHAR4d BHAR4d BHAR4d BHAR4d BHAR4d BHAR4d 
CAShort 0.154***  0.155*** 0.152*** 0.170*** 0.167*** 
 (5.99)  (6.20) (6.51) (6.18) (6.56) 
R_uncertainty  -0.046** -0.054**  -0.044*  
  (-2.14) (-2.46)  (-1.80)  
R_negative  0.037** 0.042** 0.043** 0.050** 0.051** 
  (2.01) (2.16) (2.18) (2.57) (2.60) 
R_modalweak    -0.039***  -0.037*** 
    (-3.48)  (-3.03) 
Download     -0.054*** -0.054*** 
     (-3.86) (-3.82) 
CAShort×R_uncertainty   -0.012  -0.013  
   (-0.73)  (-0.75)  
CAShort×R_negative   -0.002 0.001 0.007 0.011 
   (-0.14) (0.07) (0.42) (0.68) 
CAShort×R_modalweak    -0.035**  -0.042** 
    (-2.21)  (-2.31) 
CAShort×Download     -0.046** -0.048*** 
     (-2.59) (-2.77) 
Ln(n_words) -0.030 -0.078*** -0.090*** -0.060*** -0.078*** -0.057** 
 (-1.66) (-2.71) (-3.09) (-2.79) (-2.65) (-2.63) 
Ln(n_filing) -0.067*** -0.074*** -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.090*** -0.090*** 
 (-2.82) (-3.15) (-2.79) (-2.76) (-3.37) (-3.36) 
Ln(SZ) 0.460*** 0.479*** 0.477*** 0.479*** 0.475*** 0.477*** 
 (6.20) (6.34) (6.42) (6.54) (7.04) (7.18) 
Ln(B/M) 0.152*** 0.149*** 0.153*** 0.150*** 0.152*** 0.150*** 
 (6.08) (5.83) (5.99) (5.95) (5.26) (5.23) 
Pr1y -0.037* -0.031 -0.039* -0.038** -0.038** -0.038** 
 (-1.92) (-1.57) (-1.98) (-2.00) (-2.00) (-2.02) 
Intercept -0.011*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.023*** -0.021*** 
 (-4.12) (-5.84) (-4.93) (-4.88) (-4.58) (-4.45) 
Observations 17,288 17,322 17,288 17,288 16,006 16,006 
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 
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Table 6: Return predictability of abnormal shorting volume and textual information in 1 to 52-weeks ahead 
 
This table reports the results of following cumulative abnormal return regression in 1 50 52 weeks ahead: 
 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅1𝑤 … 52𝑤𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽0𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
3
𝑗=1 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡  
+𝛽5𝐿𝑛(𝑛_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠)𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑛(𝑛_𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔)𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝜃𝑗𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 × 𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
3
𝑗=1   
+𝜃4𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 × 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑑𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 
 
where 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅1𝑤 … 52𝑤𝑖,𝑡  ( 𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ) is the 1-week…52-week cumulative abnormal return (the cumulative 
shorting volume during the event window [0, 3]). Textual includes R_uncertainty, R_modalweak, and R_negative. 
All variables are defined in the Appendix and are standardized to have the mean of 0 and the standard deviation of 1. 
We obtain the initial 10-Ks textual data from the website of The Notre Dame Software Repository for Accounting 
and Finance, daily shorting volume data from the FINRA website, the number of 10-Ks requests by hedge funds 
from the EDGAR system, and stock price, returns, shares outstanding, trading volume, and accounting data from the 
CRSP/Compustat. All models include stock fixed-effects and year-month dummy variables. Standard errors are 
double clustered at the firm and year-month levels. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. The sample period is from September 2009 to December 2015. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 BHAR1w BHAR1w BHAR2w BHAR2w BHAR4w BHAR4w 
CAShort 0.126*** 0.125*** 0.097*** 0.096*** 0.073*** 0.072*** 
 (5.81) (5.99) (5.17) (5.37) (4.90) (5.09) 
R_uncertainty -0.033**  -0.014  -0.028  
 (-2.02)  (-0.60)  (-1.49)  
R_negative 0.047** 0.048** 0.039* 0.040* 0.035* 0.035* 
 (2.52) (2.60) (1.89) (1.97) (1.79) (1.82) 
R_modalweak  -0.032**  -0.027**  -0.020 
  (-2.50)  (-2.13)  (-1.60) 
Download -0.021 -0.021 -0.021* -0.021* -0.021 -0.021 
 (-1.47) (-1.50) (-1.73) (-1.75) (-1.37) (-1.39) 
CAShort×R_uncertainty 0.003  -0.006  -0.011  
 (0.20)  (-0.33)  (-0.83)  
CAShort×R_negative -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 -0.010 -0.008 
 (-0.40) (-0.33) (-0.39) (-0.29) (-0.63) (-0.48) 
CAShort×R_modalweak  -0.017  -0.019  -0.021 
  (-0.81)  (-1.09)  (-1.47) 
CAShort×Download -0.027** -0.029** -0.019 -0.020 -0.020* -0.021* 
 (-2.06) (-2.30) (-1.31) (-1.46) (-1.77) (-1.90) 
Ln(n_words) -0.065*** -0.050** -0.058** -0.057*** -0.057** -0.041** 
 (-2.69) (-2.36) (-2.09) (-3.31) (-2.36) (-2.47) 
Ln(n_filing) -0.061** -0.060** -0.077*** -0.077*** -0.094*** -0.093*** 
 (-2.11) (-2.11) (-2.80) (-2.82) (-3.91) (-3.94) 
Ln(SZ) 0.394*** 0.396*** 0.331*** 0.334*** 0.111 0.112 
 (4.74) (4.76) (2.90) (2.95) (0.84) (0.85) 
Ln(B/M) 0.172*** 0.171*** 0.227*** 0.226*** 0.199*** 0.197*** 
 (6.00) (6.02) (7.46) (7.55) (7.04) (7.05) 
Pr1y -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.062** -0.062** -0.054** -0.054** 
 (-3.02) (-3.03) (-2.55) (-2.56) (-2.22) (-2.21) 
Intercept -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.014* -0.013 0.004 0.005 
 (-3.02) (-2.80) (-1.67) (-1.66) (0.38) (0.51) 
Observations 16,004 16,004 16,004 16,004 16,001 16,001 
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 
 
  




 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 BHAR12w BHAR12w BHAR24w BHAR24w BHAR52w BHAR52w 
CAShort 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.038*** -0.004 -0.005 
 (2.89) (2.80) (2.79) (2.74) (-0.50) (-0.58) 
R_uncertainty -0.051**  -0.041*  -0.016  
 (-2.04)  (-1.92)  (-0.83)  
R_negative 0.025 0.023 -0.001 -0.002 -0.034* -0.033* 
 (1.61) (1.48) (-0.05) (-0.13) (-1.76) (-1.73) 
R_modalweak  0.001  -0.005  -0.024* 
  (0.07)  (-0.36)  (-1.80) 
Download -0.013 -0.013 -0.042*** -0.043*** -0.057*** -0.058*** 
 (-0.82) (-0.83) (-2.89) (-2.91) (-3.77) (-3.80) 
CAShort×R_uncertainty -0.028**  -0.022  -0.017  
 (-2.05)  (-1.58)  (-1.28)  
CAShort×R_negative -0.007 -0.004 -0.009 -0.006 -0.015 -0.013 
 (-0.46) (-0.25) (-0.61) (-0.45) (-1.15) (-1.07) 
CAShort×R_modalweak  -0.020  -0.015  -0.009 
  (-1.34)  (-1.17)  (-0.78) 
CAShort×Download -0.009 -0.008 -0.021* -0.019 -0.005 -0.003 
 (-0.66) (-0.56) (-1.78) (-1.66) (-0.43) (-0.31) 
Ln(n_words) -0.098*** -0.054*** -0.063*** -0.029** -0.027 -0.023 
 (-3.63) (-4.37) (-2.96) (-2.31) (-1.22) (-1.40) 
Ln(n_filing) -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.052** -0.052** -0.028 -0.028 
 (-3.32) (-3.34) (-2.59) (-2.59) (-1.42) (-1.40) 
Ln(SZ) -0.572*** -0.578*** -0.851*** -0.855*** -1.727*** -1.725*** 
 (-5.83) (-5.98) (-5.10) (-5.15) (-8.20) (-8.17) 
Ln(B/M) 0.147*** 0.144*** 0.156*** 0.153*** 0.133*** 0.131*** 
 (4.45) (4.38) (5.07) (5.01) (3.58) (3.53) 
Pr1y -0.034* -0.033 -0.023 -0.022 0.002 0.002 
 (-1.69) (-1.66) (-1.43) (-1.38) (0.12) (0.13) 
Intercept 0.044*** 0.047*** 0.085*** 0.087*** 0.182*** 0.183*** 
 (5.84) (6.51) (6.74) (6.92) (10.22) (10.15) 
Observations 15,976 15,976 15,934 15,934 15,766 15,766 
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.22 0.22 
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Table 7: Return predictability using fitted abnormal shorting volume 
 
This table reports the results from the following regression of cumulative abnormal returns on fitted cumulative 
abnormal shorting volume: 
 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅4𝑑𝑖,𝑡  (𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅1𝑤 … 52𝑤𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡̂ 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑛(𝑛_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠)𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑛(𝑛_𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔)𝑡  
+𝛽4𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡  +𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑑𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 
 
where 𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡̂ 𝑖,𝑡 is the fitted cumulative abnormal shorting volume during the event window [0, 3] and is obtained 
from the following regression, 
 𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡̂ 𝑖,𝑡 = ?̂? + ∑ ?̂?𝑗𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
3
𝑗=1 ,  
where ?̂?  and ?̂?𝑗  are the estimates from the above equation. Textual includes R_uncertainty, R_modalweak, and 
R_negative. All variables are defined in the Appendix and are standardized to have the mean of 0 and the standard 
deviation of 1. We obtain the initial 10-Ks textual data from the website of The Notre Dame Software Repository for 
Accounting and Finance, daily shorting volume data from the FINRA website, the number of 10-Ks requests by 
hedge funds from the EDGAR system, and stock price, returns, shares outstanding, trading volume, and accounting 
data from the CRSP/Compustat. All models include stock fixed-effects and year-month dummy variables. Standard 
errors are double clustered at the firm and year-month levels. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. The sample period is from September 2009 to December 2015. 
 
 (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 BHAR4d BHAR1w BHAR2w BHAR4w BHAR12w BHAR24w BHAR52w 
𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡̂ 𝑖,𝑡 -0.042*** -0.035*** -0.028** -0.024* -0.006 -0.012 -0.026** 
 (-2.92) (-2.84) (-2.13) (-1.94) (-0.43) (-0.76) (-2.07) 
Ln(n_words) -0.046** -0.039** -0.047*** -0.034** -0.046*** -0.032** -0.038** 
 (-2.56) (-2.11) (-3.02) (-2.00) (-3.75) (-2.35) (-2.65) 
Ln(n_filing) -0.085*** -0.055** -0.072*** -0.091*** -0.072*** -0.049** -0.026 
 (-3.35) (-2.10) (-2.77) (-3.97) (-3.38) (-2.61) (-1.36) 
Download -0.040*** -0.010 -0.013 -0.015 -0.011 -0.041*** -0.058*** 
 (-2.92) (-0.74) (-0.97) (-1.05) (-0.71) (-2.79) (-3.85) 
Ln(SZ) 0.449*** 0.361*** 0.314*** 0.104 -0.577*** -0.824*** -1.661*** 
 (6.61) (4.46) (2.77) (0.78) (-6.05) (-5.09) (-8.07) 
Ln(B/M) 0.147*** 0.163*** 0.220*** 0.195*** 0.141*** 0.148*** 0.125*** 
 (5.35) (6.11) (7.57) (6.95) (4.40) (5.04) (3.46) 
Pr1y -0.027 -0.048*** -0.051** -0.046** -0.028 -0.019 0.002 
 (-1.56) (-2.72) (-2.33) (-2.04) (-1.55) (-1.32) (0.13) 
Intercept -0.035*** -0.032*** -0.024*** -0.012** 0.010** 0.024*** 0.086*** 
 (-9.42) (-7.98) (-4.63) (-2.10) (2.27) (3.21) (6.96) 
Observations 16,034 16,032 16,032 16,029 16,004 15,962 15,792 
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.22 
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Table 8: Revisions of analysts’ earnings forecasts around 10-K filing dates 
 
This table reports the results of the following regression on the revisions of analysts’ earnings forecasts: 
 ∆𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆1𝑖,𝑡(∆𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆2𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽0𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
3
𝑗=1 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡  
+𝛽5𝐿𝑛(𝑛_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠)𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑛(𝑛_𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔)𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝜃𝑗𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 × 𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
3
𝑗=1   
+𝜃4𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 × 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑑𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 
 
where ∆𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆1 (∆𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆2) is the revision of analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts per share for fiscal year 1 (2) 
earnings from month t-1 to month t+1, where t is the 10-K filing month. Textual includes R_uncertainty, 
R_modalweak, and R_negative. All variables are defined in the Appendix and are standardized to have the mean of 0 
and the standard deviation of 1. We obtain the initial 10-Ks textual data from the website of The Notre Dame 
Software Repository for Accounting and Finance, daily shorting volume data from the FINRA website, the number 
of 10-Ks requests by hedge funds from the EDGAR system, and stock price, returns, shares outstanding, trading 
volume, and accounting data from the CRSP/Compustat. All models include stock fixed-effects and year-month 
dummy variables. Standard errors are double clustered at the firm and year-month levels. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The sample period is from September 2009 to December 
2015. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ΔFEPS1 ΔFEPS1 ΔFEPS2 ΔFEPS2 
CAShort 0.008 0.007 -0.026** -0.026** 
 (0.54) (0.51) (-2.04) (-2.03) 
R_uncertainty -0.037  -0.019  
 (-1.33)  (-1.00)  
R_negative 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.043** 0.044** 
 (2.82) (2.84) (2.23) (2.31) 
R_modalweak  -0.026*  -0.034** 
  (-1.88)  (-2.31) 
Download -0.008 -0.009 0.002 0.001 
 (-0.52) (-0.59) (0.11) (0.05) 
CAShort×R_uncertainty -0.019*  -0.010  
 (-1.82)  (-0.84)  
CAShortt×R_negative -0.025 -0.023 -0.038** -0.037** 
 (-1.26) (-1.12) (-2.17) (-2.12) 
CAShort×R_modalweak  -0.003  0.003 
  (-0.29)  (0.30) 
CAShort×Download -0.028** -0.027** -0.037*** -0.036*** 
 (-2.36) (-2.30) (-3.13) (-2.99) 
Ln(n_words) -0.027 -0.006 -0.009 -0.008 
 (-0.96) (-0.41) (-0.44) (-0.58) 
Ln(n_filing) -0.009 -0.009 -0.026 -0.026 
 (-0.38) (-0.38) (-1.16) (-1.16) 
Ln(SZ) 0.037 0.035 0.045 0.044 
 (0.25) (0.23) (0.41) (0.40) 
Ln(B/M) 0.169*** 0.166*** 0.125*** 0.123*** 
 (4.46) (4.45) (3.37) (3.36) 
Pr1y 0.025* 0.025* 0.007 0.008 
 (1.69) (1.69) (0.46) (0.48) 
Intercept -0.041*** -0.040*** -0.025* -0.024* 
 (-2.87) (-2.73) (-1.84) (-1.80) 
Observations 11525 11525 11261 11261 
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.16 0.25 0.25 
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Table 9: Changes of fundamental ratios after filing dates 
 
This table reports the results of the following fundamental change regression: 
 ∆𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽0𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
3
𝑗=1 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡  
+𝛽5𝐿𝑛(𝑛_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠)𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑛(𝑛_𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔)𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝜃𝑗𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 × 𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
3
𝑗=1   
+𝜃4𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 × 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑑𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 
 
where ∆𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 is the change in firm fundamental ratios from fiscal year t to t+1. ∆𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 is ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴, 
∆𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛, or ∆𝑂𝑃𝑀. Textual includes R_uncertainty, R_modalweak, and R_negative. All variables are defined 
in the Appendix and are standardized to have the mean of 0 and the standard deviation of 1. We obtain the initial 10-
Ks textual data from the website of The Notre Dame Software Repository for Accounting and Finance, daily 
shorting volume data from the FINRA website, the number of 10-Ks requests by hedge funds from the EDGAR 
system, and stock price, returns, shares outstanding, trading volume, and accounting data from the 
CRSP/Compustat. All models include stock fixed-effects and year-month dummy variables. Standard errors are 
double clustered at the firm and year-month levels. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. The sample period is from September 2009 to December 2015. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴 ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴 ∆𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛 ∆𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛 ∆𝑂𝑃𝑀 ∆𝑂𝑃𝑀 
CAShort 0.024 0.024 0.001 0.001 0.017 0.017 
 (1.16) (1.18) (0.08) (0.05) (1.09) (1.12) 
R_uncertainty 0.021  0.004  -0.018  
 (0.85)  (0.16)  (-1.11)  
R_negative 0.047*** 0.049*** 0.097*** 0.099*** -0.003 -0.003 
 (2.65) (2.78) (4.34) (4.35) (-0.19) (-0.21) 
R_modalweak  -0.002  -0.014  -0.006 
  (-0.16)  (-0.89)  (-0.67) 
Download -0.044*** -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.012* -0.013* 
 (-2.95) (-2.89) (-2.97) (-2.96) (-1.74) (-1.76) 
CAShort×R_uncertainty -0.031*  -0.001  -0.011  
 (-1.71)  (-0.09)  (-1.60)  
CAShort×R_negative -0.016 -0.013 -0.015 -0.014 -0.034* -0.034 
 (-1.04) (-0.84) (-0.91) (-0.85) (-1.68) (-1.64) 
CAShort×R_modalweak  -0.021  -0.013  0.001 
  (-1.21)  (-0.95)  (0.14) 
CAShort×Download -0.029* -0.027 -0.001 -0.002 -0.010* -0.009* 
 (-1.69) (-1.60) (-0.14) (-0.26) (-1.89) (-1.68) 
Ln(n_words) -0.005 -0.025 0.015 0.006 -0.009 0.004 
 (-0.21) (-1.42) (0.53) (0.29) (-0.64) (0.42) 
Ln(n_filing) -0.032* -0.031* -0.045 -0.045 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-1.99) (-1.99) (-1.62) (-1.61) (-0.03) (-0.04) 
Ln(SZ) -0.314** -0.311** -0.157** -0.153** -0.049 -0.050 
 (-2.48) (-2.45) (-2.26) (-2.19) (-0.70) (-0.72) 
Ln(B/M) 0.071 0.071 0.364*** 0.365*** 0.026 0.024 
 (1.54) (1.53) (11.60) (11.68) (1.33) (1.28) 
Pr1y 0.052** 0.052** -0.015 -0.015 -0.000 0.000 
 (2.53) (2.56) (-0.89) (-0.92) (-0.00) (0.05) 
Intercept 0.015* 0.011 0.003 0.002 -0.002 0.000 
 (1.83) (1.46) (0.50) (0.34) (-0.31) (0.05) 
Observations 15,670 15,670 15,450 15,450 15,519 15,519 
Adjusted R2 -0.02 -0.02 0.05 0.05 0.24 0.24 
 
  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3683086
 
45 
Table 10: Predictability of crash risk 
 
This table reports the results from the following regression on firms’ crash risk in fiscal year t+1: 
 𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽0𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
3
𝑗=1 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡  
+𝛽5𝐿𝑛(𝑛_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠)𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑛(𝑛_𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔)𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝜃𝑗𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 × 𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
3
𝑗=1   
+𝜃4𝐶𝐴𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 × 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑑𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 
 
where 𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 is a firm’s crash risk in fiscal year t+1. Our 𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 measures include 𝑁𝑆𝑘𝑒𝑤, 𝐷𝑈𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑅, and 
𝑛_𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ. Textual includes R_uncertainty, R_modalweak, and R_negative. All variables are defined in the Appendix 
and are standardized to have the mean of 0 and the standard deviation of 1. We obtain the initial 10-Ks textual data 
from the website of The Notre Dame Software Repository for Accounting and Finance, daily shorting volume data 
from the FINRA website, the number of 10-Ks requests by hedge funds from the EDGAR system, and stock price, 
returns, shares outstanding, trading volume, and accounting data from the CRSP/Compustat. All models include 
stock fixed-effects and year-month dummy variables. Standard errors are double clustered at the firm and year-
month levels. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The sample period is from 
September 2009 to December 2015. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 𝐷𝑈𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑅 𝐷𝑈𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑅 𝑁𝑆𝑘𝑒𝑤 𝑁𝑆𝑘𝑒𝑤 𝑛_𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑛_𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ 
CAShort 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.008 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.81) (0.84) (0.78) (0.78) (-0.32) (-0.28) 
R_uncertainty -0.048*  -0.046*  -0.039  
 (-1.92)  (-1.78)  (-1.51)  
R_negative 0.016 0.014 0.018 0.016 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.79) (0.70) (0.98) (0.91) (-0.06) (-0.10) 
R_modalweak  -0.008  -0.011  -0.017 
  (-0.46)  (-0.55)  (-0.93) 
Download -0.010 -0.011 -0.012 -0.013 -0.014 -0.014 
 (-0.74) (-0.80) (-0.89) (-0.95) (-1.15) (-1.22) 
CAShort×R_uncertainty 0.021**  0.018*  0.009  
 (2.00)  (1.73)  (0.72)  
CAShort×R_negative -0.002 -0.003 0.000 -0.001 0.004 0.003 
 (-0.18) (-0.36) (0.04) (-0.11) (0.42) (0.33) 
CAShort×R_modalweak  0.016  0.011  0.012 
  (1.56)  (1.15)  (1.10) 
CAShort×Download -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 -0.005 -0.005 
 (-0.80) (-0.90) (-0.87) (-0.98) (-0.43) (-0.45) 
Ln(n_words) -0.033 0.005 -0.031 0.004 -0.019 0.007 
 (-1.04) (0.20) (-1.01) (0.15) (-0.65) (0.30) 
Ln(n_filing) -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 -0.007 -0.007 
 (-0.42) (-0.43) (-0.40) (-0.40) (-0.31) (-0.31) 
Ln(SZ) 0.970*** 0.966*** 0.855*** 0.851*** 0.585*** 0.583*** 
 (9.59) (9.48) (9.04) (8.94) (8.00) (7.87) 
Ln(B/M) 0.013 0.012 0.016 0.015 0.010 0.008 
 (0.48) (0.41) (0.61) (0.54) (0.42) (0.34) 
Pr1y -0.016** -0.016** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.008 -0.008 
 (-2.37) (-2.31) (-2.71) (-2.65) (-1.12) (-1.07) 
Intercept -0.041*** -0.035*** -0.032*** -0.027*** -0.016*** -0.012** 
 (-5.58) (-4.78) (-4.44) (-3.85) (-3.15) (-2.34) 
Observations 15,311 15,311 15,311 15,311 15,310 15,310 
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.03 
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